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Members of the Catholic community in the United States often disagree 
concerning the proper care of a person in a state of permanent 
unconsciousness. For example, a few years ago, Hugh Finn, suffering from 
brain damage incurred in an automobile accident, was the person about 
whom the dispute centered. Even though they foresaw that his death would 
Occur following removal of life support, his wife Michelle and one of 
Hugh's sisters wanted to have artificial hydration and nutrition (AHN) 
removed because "it was not helping him." Though Hugh had stated before 
his accident that he would not desire life support if he were permanently 
unconscious, other members of his family desired to have AHN continued. 
Said Hugh's father, "[t's murder as far as I am concerned.") Even though 
they were diametrically opposed, members of the Catholic community, 
claiming "to speak for the Church," supported both sides of the family. 
Why is there still such disagreement in regard to this issue within the 
Catholic community? Usually, the official position of the Church is clear, 
and though some people may disagree with the official position, there is no 
doubt that they are dissenting from the official teaching and have no right 
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"to speak for the Church." While general principles for removing life 
support have been stated in magisterial teaching,2 there is no authoritative 
magisterial teaching in regard to specific treatment of people in a state of 
permanent unconsciousness,) so different theological opinions have been 
formulated. This article will present the various opinions held by members 
of the Catholic Church in the United States in regard to removing AHN 
from people in a permanent state of unconsciousness (persistent vegetative 
state, PVS). The first opinion views AHN as ordinary care and morally 
obligatory. The second viewpoint contends that AHN is a medical 
treatment that should be offered unless it is physiologically futile or 
excessively burdensome. The third opinion states that AHN may be 
discontinued in the case of the patient in PVS primarily because it offers no 
benefit to the patient and secondarily because it may at times impose a 
grave burden. This article will seek to evaluate these opinions, and opt for 
one of them as being more in accord with the anthropology identified with 
Catholic tradition. 
Before examining the varying positions in the Catholic community, a 
few words to explain the condition of Hugh Finn and other persons in a 
permanent unconscious condition, in medical terminology often called 
persistent vegetative state (PVS, although more precisely for our 
discussion: permanent vegetative state), will be helpful.4 A person in PVS 
is still a human being, but functions only at the biological level. The brain 
stem is often intact so the functions of respiration, digestion and bodily 
homeostasis continue. In some patients however, the brain stem is partially 
damaged. For these patients, if physiological function is to be sustained, a 
ventilator may be necessary in order to assist pulmonary and cardiac 
functions. People in a permanent vegetative state have "sleep-wake" cycles 
meaning that their eyes are often open but they do not track on anything 
and have no meaningful response to stimulus. Grunts and groans may also 
be emitted, but they have no meaningful significance. Because of injury or 
dysfunction in the cerebral cortex (sometimes called the "higher brain"), 
the power to think, choose, love, and relate to others is lost. The function 
of eating is also lost due to a lack of coordination between chewing and 
swallowing even though gag, swallowing, and cough reflexes may be 
preserved and the functions of digesting and waste elimination are 
maintained. Bodily nutrition may be maintained through AHN. As far as 
medical research is able to discern, withdrawal of AHN from patients in 
PVS does not cause any change in pain level for the patient.s 
PVS differs from other conditions such as coma, locked-in state, and 
akinetic mutism. People often recover from coma, but the unconscious 
condition associated with PVS is deemed to be permanent if the vegetative 
state persists for longer than a year in cases of acute traumatic injury or 
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three months in cases of non-traumatic acute injury. Recovery after such a 
period of time is exceedingly rare. It seems that only a few cases of 
recovery from PVS have been carefully documented; in two of these cases 
the patients were unable to speak and were bedridden for the rest of their 
Iives.6 Recovery may not be physically impossible, but the paucity of cases 
of recovery, especially without severe impairment, allow the statement that 
recovery after a firm diagnosis of PVS is morally impossible. A permanent 
vegetative state then is 'a recognized medical prognosis based on 
observation over the course of a given time period. "Decisions to terminate 
treatment can only be reached after the PVS patient has been assessed by 
repeated neurological examinations performed on successive days by a 
physician experienced in the assessment of unconscious patients.,,7 For the 
purposes of this article, it is presumed that an accurate diagnosis and 
prognosis have been made regarding patients and that they will not recover 
cognitive and affective abilities given the degree of moral certitude 
possible in medicine. 
Some people object to the description of patients as "vegetative" as 
though it indicates they are less than human. While the term could be 
understood with this connotation, it more exactly refers to the person's 
ability to function only at the biological level, not to a lack of personhood 
of the individual person. Cognitive-affective function, the foundation of 
any spiritual activity, is not possible for a person in PVS. According to the 
concept of the human person common in Catholic theology, the spirit or the 
soul of the person still maintains the radical power to perform human acts 
of cognitive-affective function but the actual performance of these acts is 
impossible due to dysfunction in that part of the body which is necessary 
for cognitive-affective function: the cerebral cortex.8 
The First Opinion 
Basically there are three opinions held by people in the Catholic 
community in regard to the use of AHN for patients in PVS.9 The first 
opinion looks upon the removal of AHN from a PVS patient as a serious 
violation of the right to life, and often implies that removal of AHN from a 
PVS patient is an act of euthanasia. '0 This opinion seems to be based upon 
the fact that death will follow removal of AHN and that for some, any act 
from which death follows is an act of euthanasia. Proponents of this 
opinion maintain that only when a patient is in a "terminal condition" and 
in "imminent danger of death" may life support be removed." As long as 
AHN continues to do the job for which it was designed, to keep the person 
alive, it should not be removed. This opinion seems to draw some support 
from a recent statement of Pope John Paul II in Evangelium Vitae, that life 
August, 200 I 203 
support may be declared disproportionate or an excessive burden when 
death is clearly imminent or inevitable. 12 However, this text cannot be 
interpreted to allow foregoing life support only when death is imminent and 
inevitable because the statement in question is taken from the "Declaration 
on Euthanasia", which in accord with Catholic tradition, specifically allows 
withdrawal of life support even if death is not imminent and life support is 
judged to be disproportionate or imposes an excessive burden. The 
document specifically asks the question: "Is it necessary in all 
circumstances to have recourse to all possible remedies?" and then lists at 
least five situations other than the case of imminent and inevitable death, in 
which life support may be removed. 13 People who hold this opinion 
frequently equate the removal of AHN with painfully "starving a patient to 
death" or with abandoning the patient or showing disrespect for life. 14 But 
removing AHN from patients in PVS or in the last stages of an illness does 
not cause the pain of hunger and thirst as it would in a healthy person who 
is deprived of food and water" s Moreover, people can show solidarity and 
love for loved ones by allowing them to die and praying for them when life 
support is no longer beneficial, more so than by prolonging their lives when 
it is not helpful for the patient. Finally, removing AHN does not mean that 
the direct moral cause of death is starvation or dehydration. Rather, the 
pathology which directly causes death is the dysfunction of the cerebral 
cortex. Because of this pathology, the patient is unable to eat and drink on 
his own. Up until the removal of AHN, the effects of this pathology have 
been circumvented by use of AHN. Just as a respirator circumvents 
ineffective function of the lungs, but may be removed if it does not offer 
hope of benefit or imposes an excessive burden, so removal of AHN merely 
allows the pathology in question to take its natural course. As Pope Pius 
XII stated in 1957, the foreseen death of a patient from whom life support 
is removed is an "indirect voluntary,,,16 a term used by some manualist-
theologians to signify the use of the principle of double effect. 17 Some 
people argue that because the purpose of AHN "is not to effect a cure but 
rather to keep the person alive by providing nutrition one may not withdraw 
AHN on the basis that it is ineffective if, in fact, it does keep the patient 
alive.,,18 However, the same thing can frequently be said of a ventilator 
which often does not effect a cure yet is readily discontinued if it does not 
offer hope of benefit or imposes an excessive burden. Thus, the fact that 
AHN is designed to circumvent rather than cure a pathology is not relevant 
to the ethical discussion concerning its use. 
Occasionally, the argument is offered by proponents of this first 
position that a feeding tube and nutrition are very inexpensive and 
comparatively easy for the medical professionals to install so they could 
never be considered an extraordinary means to prolong Iife. 19 In other 
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words, this opinion tends to judge whether the means to prolong life are 
ordinary or extraordinary (morally imperative or morally free) in the 
abstract, without reference to the condition of the patient. As Kevin 
Wildes pointed out in a thorough study of the means to prolong life, this 
attitude is not in accord with Catholic tradition.20 It dehumanizes the 
person because it neglects the needs of the person by concentrating on the 
medical therapy alone. This first opinion was popular when the Nancy 
Beth Cruzan case was in the news in the late 1980s. Then its popularity 
seemed to wane, perhaps as a result of several court decisions which 
allowed removal of AHN from PVS patients and the opinions expressed by 
several professional societies.21 But it seems to be gaining adherents once 
again as avid pro-life proponents seek to oppose any and all withdrawal of 
life support and persuade people to fill out their advance directives to 
insure that AHN will always be used, no matter what the cirucmstances.22 
While this opinion is often invoked by people maintaining that they are 
fighting the movement toward euthanasia in the United States, others allege 
that such an absolutist position disposes for euthanasia because this opinion 
would allow withdrawal of life support only if death were imminent, no 
matter what the quality of function or the suffering of the individual 
patient. 
This first opinion seems to be concerned with the physical effects of 
withdrawing life support, not with the moral object as such.23 This 
difference in moral evaluation is well expressed by the statement of the 
Pro-Life Committee of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops 
(PLC): 
We should not assume that all or most decisions to withhold or 
withdraw medically assisted nutrition and hydration are attempts to 
cause death. To be sure, any patient will die if nutrition and hydration 
are withheld. But sometimes, other causes are at work, for example, 
the patient may be imminently dying, whether feeding takes place or 
not, from an already existing terminal condition. At other times, 
although the shortening of the patient's life is one foreseeable result 
of an omission, the real purpose of the omission was to relieve the 
patient of a particular procedure that is of limited usefulness to the 
patient or unreasonably burdensome for the patient and the patient's 
family or caregivers. This kind of decision should not be equated 
with a decision to kill or with suicide (emphasis added).24 
Ultimately, the underlying conviction of people who hold this first 
opinion seems to be that AHN for PVS patients is not a medical device or 
medical treatment, but merely comfort or normal care which would be 
moral1y obligatory when physiological1y effective.25 The aforementioned 
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opinions of medical societies, as well as the medical expertise needed to 
install AHN, and the fact that AHN does nothing to increase the comfort of 
the patient contradicts this conviction.26 
Tbe Second Opinion 
The second opinion extant in the Catholic community does not 
prohibit the removal AHN from patients in PVS. However, as we shall see, 
in its interpretation of "hope of benefit" and "excessive burden," it does 
limit the criteria which may be used for removal. This opinion was 
expressed most authoritatively in 1992 by the PLC and is held by some 
theologians and philosophers,27 but was never adopted by the 
Administrative Board of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops 
(NCCB) nor by the NCCB as a whole. It is of considerable importance 
within the Catholic community in the United States as a pastoral statement, 
even though the PLC does not promulgate doctrinal statements. While the 
document of the PLC "repeats solid principles," it also contains 
"contingent and conjectural elements," which mitigate its doctrinal 
authority.28 As the PLC itself declared, the document states "the first 
word" which may be revised before the " last word" is spoken. Briefly, this 
opinion may be expressed in the words of the Committee: 
.. .. it is our considered judgment that while legitimate Catholic 
debate continues, decisions concerning these patients (PVS) should 
be guided by a presumption in favor of medically assisted nutrition 
and hydration. A decision to discontinue such measures should be 
made in light of a careful assessment of the burdens and benefits of 
nutrition and hydration for the individual patient and his or her 
family and community. Such measures must not be withdrawn in 
order to cause death, but they may be withdrawn if they offer no 
reasonable hope of sustaining life or pose excessive risks or burdens 
(emphasis added).29 
There is no dispute in the United States Catholic community in regard 
to teaching and theology concerning the intention of removing life support. 
It must not be to kill the patient, but rather to stop doing something 
disproportionate (no hope of benefit) or to benefit the patient by removing 
a burdensome therapy (remove an excessive burden). In traditional 
Catholic theology, evidence that people act ethically when removing life 
support is drawn either from "no hope of benefit" or from "excessive 
burden." "No hope of benefit" simply means that the goods for which one 
seeks medical therapy are not forthcoming from the therapy; "excessive 
burden" means that any benefits forthcoming from use of a therapy are 
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outweighed significantly by the burdens. Burdens may be spiritual, 
psychic, and economic as well as physiological. These criteria are stated in 
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services 
(ERD),30 a document prepared by the United States Bishops to maintain 
ethical standards in the provision of health care in Catholic health care 
facilities. If the medical therapy offers hope of benefit and does not impose 
an excessive burden, it is called an ordinary or proportionate means of 
preserving life. If it either offers no hope of benefit or imposes an 
excessive burden, it is called an extraordinary or disproportionate means to 
prolong Iife.31 
While there is agreement in theory concerning the general norms for 
removing life support, when applying the criteria to particular situations, 
the PLC and the theologians who agree with them adopt a narrow 
interpretation of "hope of benefit" and "excessive burden." They consider 
the prolongation of life in the PVS condition as an "intrinsic good" and a 
"great benefit.,,32 According to this interpretation, if life can be prolonged 
for PVS patients through the use of AHN, it must never be withdrawn or 
withheld on the grounds that it is not providing a benefit to the person. 
Thus, in the previously cited passage, the PLC translates "no hope of 
benefit" as "no reasonable hope of sustaining life." For practical purposes 
then, if the AHN is prolonging life, "doing its job" as some theologians 
maintain,33 only the criterion of excessive burden may be used to withdraw 
life support. The notion of life being "an intrinsic and great good" is 
included in the PLC document and other statements of bishops and 
theologians but it seems to stem from the moral theory of Germain Grisez, 
which holds that human life as such is an incommensurable good, and that 
people who deny this assertion are professing dualism.34 Both Ralph 
McInerny and Benedict Ashley, prominent Thomists, reject Grisez's 
interpretation because it misconstrues the notion of natural inclination and 
subordination of proximate goals to ultimate goals. Ashley observes: "the 
human body is human precisely because it is a body made for and used by 
intelligence. Why should it be dualism to unify the human body by 
subordinating the goods of the body to the good of the immaterial and 
contemplative intelligence?,,35 
Insofar as excessive burden is concerned, the proponents of this 
second opinion make an effort to consider only the burden that might be 
connected directly with the use of AHN,36 not the burden that might follow 
from the use of the therapy for the patient, the family or society, as is 
allowed in the ERD (Directives 56 and 57). Moreover, the Catholic 
tradition understands that "excessive burden" may arise from economic and 
psychic causes as well as from physiological causes. Overall then, the 
opinion expressed by the PLC and the theologians who agree with them is 
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rather limited insofar as removal of life support from PVS patients is 
concerned. Moreover, it is clear that many bishops in the United States do 
not agree with this opinion, especially when they are called upon to give 
guidance in specific cases.37 
While it does not correspond exactly to the theological 
presuppositions of the second opinion, and is more akin to the first opinion, 
there is a growing tendency among proponents of the second opinion to 
define AHN as a form of "normal or comfort care" not subject to the 
above-mentioned ethical criteria.38 Normal care is described as care which 
is always required; for example, keeping the patient comfortable, changing 
bed clothes, and avoiding bed sores. According to proponents of this 
theory, AHN is not a medical procedure or device, because it is not utilized 
in order to prolong life but rather in order to keep the patient comfortable, 
or because each person has a right to food and water. This opinion is 
directly contrary to declarations of several medical societies and legal 
opinions which explicitly declare that AHN is a medical procedure.39 
Moreover, the use of AHN for all patients in the dying process has been 
called into question recently in prestigious medical journals.40 Even if 
AHN were not a medical procedure, it does de facto prolong life, no matter 
what it is called. For this reason, it should be evaluated ethically according 
to the two aforementioned criteria: hope of benefit and degree of burden. 
Recently, the Holy Father mentioned the PLC document in an ad 
!imina address to bishops from the Western United States.41 This led some 
people to maintain that the Holy Father was proposing a clear teaching that 
AHN could not be removed from PVS patients because it offered "normal 
care.,,42 This is an overreaction to the papal statement. While the Holy 
Father seems to affirm the principles expressed by the PLC, especiaIly the 
principle of not removing life support with the proximate intention of 
causing death (finis operis) , it would be rash to maintain that he was 
correcting bishops who have affirmed the third opinion or approved the 
actions of their parishioners who acted in accord with the third opinion.43 
The Pope maintains that AHN should be provided "to all patients who need 
them." However, he offers no clarification as to how to assess necessity in 
the concrete situation. Clearly, holders of both the second and third 
opinions agree that AHN should be provided when ethicaIly necessary. 
While not a definitive statement of doctrine then, the Pope's ad /imina 
address affirms the principles stated in the PLC document and implies that 
the opinion of the Committee is "safe in practice" but it cannot be 
maintained that the third opinion is rejected.44 
Finally, the actions of several State Catholic Conferences question the 
rational consistency of the second opinion. Many states have advance 
directives which allow persons through proxy decisions to decline the use 
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of AHN, if the person is ever in a state where he cannot make health care 
decisions for himself.45 If there must be a presumption to prolong the life 
of a person in PVS unless there is evidence that prolonging life in this 
condition is an excessive burden, why is it that State Catholic Conferences, 
always under the direction of the bishops in the state, have accepted 
advance directive legislation without any serious objection? 
The Third Opinion 
The third opinion is held by many Catholic theologians and ethicists 
who work in clinical settings and by many medical societies who have 
studied the issue.46 In addition, this opinion has been followed by some 
bishops who have been called upon to offer opinions in regard to well 
publicized cases in their dioceses.47 The opinion follows the traditional 
admonition that the death of the patient must not be the proximate intention 
of the persons either requesting the removal of life support or removing it 
from the patient. But it also maintains that once a firm prognosis of 
permanent unconsciousness has been made, AHN may be removed. This 
third opinion uses both of the criteria for removing life support, originated 
by Catholic theologians at Salamanca, Spain, in the 16th century: namely, 
hope of benefit to the patient or excessive burden to the patient, his or her 
family, and to the community which is involved in caring for the patient.48 
The essential difference between the second and third opinions is that 
those who hold the third opinion maintain that continuing life support for 
people with a PVS diagnosis does not offer "hope of benefit" for the 
patient. Proponents of both the second and third opinion agree that the 
proximate intention of the people removing life support must not be to end 
the life of the patient. But the proponents of the third opinion maintain that 
the continued existence of the patient who is permanently unconscious 
offers objective evidence that life support may be removed because it is 
disproportionate or unnecessary.49 Proponents of this position support their 
opinion by referring to the purpose of health care and the purpose of life. 
Health care seeks to enable people to strive for the purpose of life, not 
merely to function at the biological level.50 Ultimately, the purpose in life 
is friendship with GOd. 51 Recall in another era we would answer the 
Catechism question, "Why did God make you?", with the response, "To 
know Him, love Him, and be happy with Him in this life and the next." To 
know, love, and be happy requires cognitive-affective function. If a person 
does not have the potential for cognitive-affective function, it does not 
mean that God does not love him or her or that the person is no longer a 
friend of God. But it does mean that the person cannot pursue the 
friendship of God, the purpose of life, through his or her free actions. 
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Therefore, the moral imperative to help the person toward health and 
existence is no longer present if there is no potential for cognitive-affective 
function and treatment offers no palliative benefit. The truth of this 
explanation is confirmed by the care given to anencephalic infants in 
Catholic hospitals. Their lives could be prolonged, maybe even for a few 
years, but no care outside of comfort care is given because they do not have 
the capacity for cognitive-affective function. This manner of treatment has 
been approved by a recent statement of the Doctrine Committee of the 
NCCB in the United States.52 
St. Thomas Aquinas gives the foundation for declaring that friendship 
with God requires cognitive-affective function when he distinguishes 
between a human act (actus humanus) which requires the activity of the 
intellect and will, and acts of the body (actus hominis) which are 
accomplished by our autonomic nervous system (bodily functions), not 
under the direction of our intellect and wilL53 Our ultimate goal, the 
purpose of life, is acquired only through human acts, not through acts of the 
body which are independent of the intellect and wilL54 People who are not 
able to perform acts of cognitive-affective function because of some 
pathology are not less human, but the moral mandate to help them prolong 
their lives is no longer present because they will never again perform 
human acts, that is, acts proceeding directly from the intellect and will. 
Clearly people in this condition, as in the case of anencephalic infants, may 
not be directly put to death nor mistreated in any way, but life support that 
keeps them alive need not be continued because it does not offer them any 
hope of benefit. 
Clinical experience attests to the fact that families have a very 
difficult time giving permission to remove life support from their loved 
ones, even if they are permanently unconscious. The decision is not made 
unless it is clear the life support is not beneficial or imposes a severe 
burden. As the statement of the PLC quoted above maintains: " ... although 
the shortening of the patient's life is one foreseeable result of an omission, 
the real purpose of the omission was to relieve the patient of a particular 
procedure that was of limited usefulness to the patient or unreasonably 
burdensome for the patient and the patient's family or caregivers 
(emphasis added).,,55 When questioned, families affirm that because 
medical technology is no longer useful , their proximate intention is to 
discontinue an inappropriate therapy, thus contributing to the well-being of 
their loved ones. The foreseen death of the patient from whom life support 
is removed because it is not effective is "an indirect voluntary." In other 
words, when AHN is removed from a patient in PVS, the principle of 
double effect is invoked.56 The act of removing a therapy or a medical 
device which is disproportionate or excessively burdensome is a good 
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moral act because the moral object of the act is to remove what has been 
judged to be an inappropriate treatment. However, the act has two effects, 
one foreseen and intended in the moral object; the other, foreseen but not 
intended as part of the moral object. In fact, if it were possible to achieve 
the first effect without the second one, the person acting would avoid 
placing the action from which the unwanted effect follows. Finally, this 
third opinion is based upon the belief that there is life after death, when, as 
the liturgy of the Church maintains in the preface for the Mass for the 
Dead, "life is changed, not ended." Thus, allowing a person to die when 
life support offers no hope of benefit to the patient or imposes an excessive 
burden is simply surrendering to God's Providence and accepting the fact 
that human life is not an absolute good. Proponents of this opinion do not 
ask whether life can be prolonged, but rather, should it be prolonged? 
Conclusion 
Given the various opinions, what opinions seem safe in practice? The 
first does not seem viable because it seems to prohibit the removal of AHN 
in all circumstances. As directives 56 and 57 of the ERD indicate, there are 
some situations in which life support may be removed. The second and 
third opinions seem viable insofar as the general principles for removing 
life support are concerned. People will judge which is the more fitting way 
to care for patients in PVS in accord with the rationale that we have 
explained for opinions two and three. 
Do both the second and third opinions fall within the realm of Church 
teaching? It would seem that they do, because as the Bishops of the United 
States declared in the Ethical and Religious Directives: "The NCCB 
Committee on Pro-Life Activities . . . points out the necessary distinctions 
between questions already resolved by the Magisterium and those that 
require further reflection, as for example. the morality of withdrawing 
medically assisted hydration and nutrition from a person who is in the 
condition which is recognized by physicians as the persistent vegetative 
state (PVS) (emphasis added).,,57 All three opinions present in 
contemporary Catholicism in the United States insist that the intention to 
remove life support must not be to kill the patient. However, the second 
and third opinions contradict the first opinion because both allow for the 
withdrawal of life support in certain circumstances in accord with the 
traditional teaching of the Church. The second opinion, however, limits in 
practice the application of the traditional teaching by maintaining that life 
in PVS is a "great benefit" and that the burdens which would justify the 
removal of life support do not include the burdens which AHN imposes 
from its very nature. The third opinion is based upon the teleological 
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aspects of medicine and human life. If the purpose of human life can no 
longer 'be obtained, it seems that no hope of benefit will come from medical 
therapy. The difference between the second and third opinions seems to 
stem ultimately from different theological and philosophical 
anthropologies. As explained above, the third opinion would not conceive 
of life in a PVS condition as beneficial for the patient because he or she is 
no longer able to strive for the purpose of life and will not regain this 
ability. When this ability is present, or may be actualized in the future, 
then friends, family and society have an obligation to offer health care and 
life support to the debilitated person, if doing so does not impose an 
excessive burden. 
The third opinion does not differ in principle from the second opinion. 
Both clearly view euthanasia as intrinsically evil. The opinions differ 
mainly in their assessment of what constitutes "hope of benefit." At times, 
the debate about the utilization of AHN for patients in PVS has been a 
contentious one within the Catholic community in the United States. 
However, much of the acrimony in the dispute could be eliminated by 
recognizing that the resolution of the debate hinges on an irenic 
examination and discussion of theological anthropology, including further 
delineation and understanding of what is beneficial for the human person 
based on the purpose and sanctity of human life. 
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